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ABSTRACT: 
 
The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra – written at the turn of the 4th to the 3rd century BC – is a classical 
work of political theory and International Relation theory. However, Kauṭilya has so far 
remained on the sidelines of the international political science discourse in spite of Max 
Weber's repeated references to the Arthaśāstra and Hans J. Morgenthau's own statement that 
his theory of political realism is (also) based on ancient Indian philosophy. The Arthaśāstra is 
a theoretical and normative work which features six pivotal idea clusters: 1) state power, 2) 
raison d'état, 3) correlation of forces between competing states based on 4) the saptāṅga theory 
of the seven “state factors” (prakr̥ti). The correlation of forces predetermines which of six 
alternative foreign policy options – the 5) ṣāḍguṇya theory – will be selected. The background 
of Kauṭilya's 'realist' statecraft is 6) matsya-nyāya theory – a political anthropology which 
features anarchy, conflicts of interest and power struggle. 
Kauṭilya's idea of political realism anticipates much of the modern notion which is associated 
not only with Machiavelli and Hobbes, but particularly with Hans J. Morgenthau and also with 
Max Weber, Helmuth Plessner and Friedrich Meinecke. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra is an 
untapped conceptional resource for theory building with respect to political theory, theorized 
statecraft and IR theory. The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra is also key for understanding the politico-
strategic culture of modern India. 
 
 
Keywords: Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, Indian political thought, saptāṅga theory, raison 
d'état, political realism 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Arthaśāstra can be characterized as the foundational work of the theory of 
political realism and Kauṭilya's theoretical achievements are (at least) on a plane with 
Machiavelli.3 Nevertheless, the Arthaśāstra has either been ignored or 'orientalized' in 
the Western political science discourse – as typified by the absurd formula of Kauṭilya 
being the 'Indian Machiavelli'. (cf. Behera 2007) Until very recently, the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra has been marginalized even in Indian social science. (cf. Bajpai/Pant 
2013; Bajpai et al. 2014, 10) Kauṭilyan ideas and concepts represent an untapped 
conceptual potential that can be used to tackle political science puzzles. That goes both 
for the history of political thought and for theory building with respect to current 
questions and puzzles of political science, including International Relations theory. 
 
                                                        
1I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Subrata K. Mitra, Prof. Dr. Hans Harder, Anne Moßner and the 
HPSACP Editorial Staff 
2Dr. des. Michael Liebig, Dipl.-Pol., is currently fellow of South Asia Institute, Heidelberg 
University and can be contacted at: m.liebig@uni-heidelberg.de 
3cf. Weber 1988 and 2008, Sarkar 1919, Nehru 1981/1944, Drekmeier 1962, Modelski 1964, 
Parmar 1987, Roy 1987, Sil 1989,  Mehta 1992, Boesche 2002, Müller 2006, Watson 2009, 
Gautam 2013a 
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Max Weber was the first Western social scientist to recognize the importance of the 
Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. He did so in his Politics as Vocation and in his sociology of 
religion studies on Hinduism. (Weber 1988, 555; 2008, 620f , 687) It is a reliable 
assumption that Hans J. Morgenthau's knew of Kauṭilya. In Politics among Nations, 
Morgenthau states that his theory of political realism is (also) derived from ancient 
Indian political philosophy and quotes from Weber's 'Hinduism study' which contains 
several references to Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra. (Morgenthau 1978, 4 and 9) 
 
Probably written around 320 BC, the Arthaśāstra is an "encyclopedic work" (Zimmer 
1973, 46) covering the (patrimonial) state, public administration, economics, law, 
foreign policy/diplomacy, military affairs and intelligence. The Arthaśāstra is a 
theoretical and normative work – no historiographical description of the Mauryan 
Empire. The 'Kauṭilyan state' is an ideal-type construction, but not an 'utopian' design 
in the sense of Thomas Morus or Campanella. The Arthaśāstra is grounded in 
Kauṭilya's extensive experience as a political actor in the creation of the Maurya 
Empire which for the first time politically unified most of the Indian subcontinent. 4 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru's treatment of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra in his Discovery of India 
has made the work and its author part of modern India's politico-cultural narrative. 
(Nehru 1981, 122-127) The core ideas of the Arthaśāstra are a significant factor of 
influence in modern India's politico-strategic culture.5 The Kauṭilyan influence is 
latent in the sense of semi-conscious, 'habitual' dispositions and preferences with 
respect to the thought and behavior in the field politico-strategic affairs – in the sense 
of the "modernity of tradition" in India. (Lloyd & Lloyd 1968 ). The reference to 
Kauṭilyan ideas is also explicit and discursive in the sense of the "re-use of the past" 
in addressing current political and strategic problems. (Mitra 2011) Thus, the adequate 
knowledge of the endogenous politico-cultural resource Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra is key 
for understanding the politico-strategic culture of modern India in the multipolar world 
system at the beginning of the 21st century. The theoretical engagement with Kauṭilyan 
ideas and concepts and their induction into the political science discourse – without 
reducing them to mere larvae-like 'precursors' of modern Western theories in political 
science – is a desideratum in political science. 
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL PUZZLES AND 
METHODOLOGICAL/THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
The Arthaśāstra's authoritative translations into English (R.P. Kangle) and German 
(J.J. Meyer) were made by Indologists. Also, the secondary literature on the work 
comes almost exclusively from the Indologists. 6 The Indological perspective is 
focused on Sanskrit philology, but with respect to specifically political issues, 
Indologists are (probably, inevitably so) 'semantic generalists'. Sanskrit philology has 
made the Arthaśāstra accessible to social science, but the philological meticulousness 
of Indologists cannot substitute political science terminology – which is the 
prerequisite for an adequate understanding of Kauṭilyan ideas. The problematic is not 
merely one of proper translation in terms of political science terminology, but brings 
up the issue of interpretation in the sense of adequate reconstruction of (latent) ideas 
or 'complexes of meaning' in the Arthaśāstra and the 'transposition' of such ideas into 
modern categories.    
 
                                                        
4cf. Kulke/Rothermund 1998, Kulke 2005, Witzel 2010 
5cf. Sidhu 1996, Dixit 2004, Kim 2004, Zaman 2006, Jones 2006, Michael 2008, Menon 2012, 
Liebig 2014   
6Hillebrandt 1923, Meyer 1926 and 1927, Jayaswal 1943, Kangle 2010/1965, Scharfe 1968, 
Ritschl/Schetlich 1973, Zimmer 1973, Kühnhardt 1988, Rangarajan 1992 
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The methodological challenge therefore is to grasp and explicate the key ideas of the 
Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra with the help of modern political science concepts and 
vocabulary – without compromising the originality and conceptual eigenvalue of these 
ideas. For example, the idea of raison d'état takes a central position in the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra – but it is not systematically explicated as category.7 In order to explicate 
this (latent) Kauṭilyan idea, the modern category of raison d'état has to be used as 
'analytical tool' and a 'conceptual repository'. 
 
The selection of categories of modern political science for the explication of the 
Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra's central ideas is made under the assumption of structural 
homology between such categories and Kauṭilyan ideas. This heuristic approach 
follows Helmuth Plessner's concept of "covariance". (Plessner 2003) The German-
Jewish social philosopher and sociologist Plessner (1892-1985) held the view, that 
substantive achievements in culture and science can occur in historically and culturally 
distant contexts. Structurally homologous ideas and concepts are not identical, but 
intrinsically related. In his 1931 study Macht und menschliche Natur 8 [Power and 
Human Nature], Plessner rejects the suppositions of mono-linear scientific progress 
and of an 'European exceptionalism' in culture and science – without, however, 
adopting a position of cultural relativism (in the 'postmodernist' sense). Plessner 
covariance approach promises a meaningful and productive correlation of Kauṭilyan 
thought with modern concepts of modern political science – without retroactively 
projecting the latter upon the first. 
 
It needs to be emphasized here that the methodology adopted here, is not the only 
conceivable approach, however one that is indispensable. In order to do justice to the 
ideational content of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra the covariance/homology approach 
ought to be complemented by one that situates Kauṭilyan ideas in the history of ideas 
of ancient Indian politico-strategic thought.       
 
In this essay, the following text-immanent concept clusters will be analyzed and 
explicated by utilizing homologous theoretical concepts and categories of modern 
political science:    
 
1. matsya-nyāya: the political anthropology of conflict of interest and power 
struggle 
2. the saptāṅga theory: state capacity defined via “the seven state factors” 
(prakr̥ti) 
3. (state) power: the aggregate of the seven prakr̥ti   
4. raison d'état: the optimization of the seven prakr̥ti   
5. the correlation of forces between states (in terms of the seven prakr̥ti) 
6. the choice of foreign policy – among six alternatives (ṣāḍguṇya) – based on 
the correlation of forces 
7. the threefold normative dimension of Kauṭilyan statecraft and the dialectics 
of purposive rationality and normativity     
8. grand strategy and the comprehensiveness of Kauṭilya's theory of the state and 
statecraft 
 
                                                        
7Similarly, in Machiavelli's Il Principe and his Discorsi the category of raison d'état is not 
explicitly articulated, yet the idea of raison d'état permeates the work   
8Would be in English: 'Power and Human Nature'; most unfortunately, no English translation 
available 
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These text-immanent concept clusters will be analyzed and explicated by utilizing 
homologous theoretical concepts and categories of modern political science, 
including:    
 
- Max Weber's concepts of power, power struggle, conflict of interest and 
(patrimonial) state.9 In addition, Weber's sociology of religion studies on 
Hinduism and Buddhism serve as a 'theoretical foil' featuring his concepts of 
the "Hindu social and life order," the ancient Indian “patrimonial state”, 
ancient Indian "Machiavellianism" and ancient Indian "cameralism". (Weber 
2008, 533-845)10   
- Friedrich Meinecke's concept of raison d'état as developed in his Die Idee der 
Staatsraison in der neueren Geschichte. (Meinecke 1963/1924)11   
- Helmuth Plessner's concept of "political anthropology" centered on the 
concept of "boundary" with respect to individual human bodies and 'social 
bodies' (family, tribe, state) (Plessner 2003/1931) 
- Hans J. Morgenthau's theory of political realism based upon the above 
concepts of Weber, Meinecke and – as a reliable assumption – Plessner.12 
 
The assumption that these concepts of modern social/political science meet the 
criteria of structural homology with the Arthaśāstra's core ideas has been tested and, 
at least preliminarily, verified. (cf. Liebig 2014, forthcoming)   
 
 
MATSYA-NYĀYA: KAUṬILYA'S POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
The precariousness of human existence – individually and collectively – is an 
indisputable fact of life for the sober realist Kauṭilya who possesses the "trained the 
recklessness of the look into the realities of life, and the ability to endure them and to 
cope with them." (Weber 1988, 558, transl. ML) The political anthropology of the 
Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra rests on two basic assumptions: 
 
 lust, greed, striving for domination are central features of man's 
anthropological constitution. Man as an individual has an anthropological 
disposition for 'egoism' and 'social bodies' of human beings too are 'selfish'.   
 these anthropological dispositions lead inevitably to conflicts of interests and 
power struggles, therefore man's political world is one of anarchy and 
insecurity within and among political communities – matsya-nyāya.  
 
Kauṭilya submits his view of the basic anthropological features of man at the very 
beginning of the Arthaśāstra. He speaks of instinct- and affect-driven behavior – “lust, 
anger, greed, pride, arrogance and fool-hardiness” as the “six enemies” which need to 
be controlled, channeled and sublimated through education and (self-)discipline, 
ethics and (criminal) law. (I, 6, 1; VIII, 3, 66)13  But being part of human nature, man's 
drives and affective impulses cannot be eradicated – neither by morality nor force. So, 
the “six enemies” have first to be acknowledged as facts of life before trying to control 
and channel them. If prostitution, drinking and gambling cannot be eradicated, the 
                                                        
9cf. Weber 1956, Weber 1988 
10Very unsatisfactory English translation: Max Weber: Religion in India: Sociology of 
Hinduism and Buddhism, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Delhi, 2012 
11English translation: Friedrich Meinecke: Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and 
its Place in Modern History, Transaction Publishers,  St. Louis, 1962   
12cf. Morgenthau 1978, 2012; Frei 1994; Scheuerman 2009, Reichwein 2010 
13The Latin number designates the book within the  Arthaśāstra and the Arabic number the 
chapter thereof (in total fifteen); when there is an additional Arabic number, it refers to the 
sūtra number within the respective chapter in Kangle's English translation (2010a/1972) 
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state should at least regulate them – and tax them for the benefit of state treasury. (cf. 
II, 25 and 27) 
 
Particularly, Kauṭilya argues, human beings must be allowed to act out their striving 
for wealth and social recognition/domination – within the boundaries of the 
established social and political order, of course. For Kauṭilya, artha – the pursuit of 
material wealth and social/political power – comes first in human existence: “Material 
well-being [artha] alone is supreme, says Kauṭilya.” (I, 7, 6) For him, artha is the 
logical and practical condition of the possibility of dharma (ethics) and kāma (sensual 
pleasure) This materialist-realist position stands at the core of Kauṭilya's political 
anthropology. Due to their 'selfish' disposition, human beings get constantly in 
conflicts of interests with each other. If men are left to themselves, these conflicts are 
usually resolved by the stronger party enforcing its will against the resistance of the 
weaker one. For Kauṭilya, this is the 'natural' state of human existence: matsya-nyāya 
– the stronger fish devouring the weaker. (cf. I, 4, 13-14; I, 13, 2-14 ) matsya-nyāya 
means 'law of the fishes' which corresponds in western terminology to 'law of the 
jungle', 'might is right' or 'anarchy'. 
 
This anthropologically derived basic situation of anarchy and arbitrariness among 
human beings can, however, be 'managed' in a 'social contract' mode. Submitting a 
kind of 'contract theory', Kauṭilya argues: as men have increasingly suffered from the 
condition of matsya-nyāya – fearing for their life and property – they concluded that 
a ruler with supreme executive power – i.e. armed with the “rod” of force and 
punishment – was needed. (cf. I, 4, 5) In agreeing to install a supreme ruler, the 
matsya-nyāya principle of 'might makes right' is monopolized by the ruler resp. the 
(patrimonial) state. Endowed with the monopoly of the use of force, the state punishes 
any person who would illegally use force (in the form of murder, assault or robbery 
etc) within its territory. In the Arthaśāstra, Kauṭilya lets a secret agent tell a crowd 
that their forebears feared for their life when matsya-nyāya ruled, so they decided to 
install a king who would enforce order and end violent anarchy. Thus the people 
should be grateful for having the king and should not complain about paying taxes to 
him. If the state were incapacitated, matsya-nyāya would return. (cf. I, 13, 2-14) 
However, while the state 'contains' matsya-nyāya on its territory by monopolizing the 
use of force, in interstate relations anarchy remains unrestricted. For Kauṭilya, the 
world of political entities/states is divided and conflicted and interstate relations are 
characterized by unrestrained matsya-nyāya. 
 
Following our heuristic approach of structural homology, let's now correlate Kauṭilya's 
political anthropology in the Arthaśāstra with Helmut Plessner's concept of political 
anthropology. The fact that the social philosopher and sociologist Plessner had also 
studied biology, is relevant here. 
 
As for all biological nature, self-preservation is constitutive of human beings. Plessner 
sees the self-protection of the human body defending the integrity of its (bodily) 
“boundaries” against the “outside” and “others” as the most fundamental 
anthropological impulse. After all, he emphasizes, man does not only 'have' a body, 
but 'is' a body. The human body is forcing man to acquire physical objects: food, 
clothing and shelter for (individual) survival. In addition, man is forced to develop 
tools and weapons to ensure food supply and physical safety against predator beasts 
and violent fellow-human beings. In view of these fundamental anthropological facts, 
Plessner views the use of normatively charged terms like 'egoism' and 'selfishness' as 
inappropriate. 
 
While human beings always remain individuals within the boundaries of their bodies, 
they are, at the same time, created biologically out of a community – father and mother 
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– and are socialized in a community – the (extended) family. Thus, despite the physical 
'boundaries' of the body separating men from from fellow-men and the 'self-interest' 
in one's own self-preservation, man is not principally anti-social. Nevertheless, from 
the primacy of (individual) self-preservation, inevitably conflicts of interest arise 
between human beings -- especially when it comes to scarce goods like food, clothing 
and shelter which are critically important for survival. These conflicts of interest can 
and often do turn into power struggles which lead to domination and subordination.    
 
The basic anthropological principle of “boundary” and self-preservation applies not 
only individuals, but also to social structures: family, clan, tribe and later political 
communities such as the (patrimonial) state. All of these 'social bodies' defend their 
boundaries against external intrusions of 'others'. The community acts like the 
individual in counter-posing a “familiar, native sphere to an unfamiliar, alien sphere". 
(Plessner 2003, 231; transl. ML) From the basic anthropological fact of the 
particularity of human beings within the community and the particularity of human 
communities vis-à-vis other communities result frictions, conflicts of interest and 
power struggles. Such conflicts can intensify to an extent that they become a friend-
foe relationship. For Plessner the friend-foe relationship is initially not a political 
category, but an anthropological fact: “The enemy is to man what is detrimental to his 
interests... [I]t is the most natural and most familiar thing in the world. But this 
familiarity and self-evidence of conflicts of interest that cause everyday quarrels and 
disputes about the smallest and the biggest things, also demonstrates... the 
entanglement of the One with the Other.” (Plessner 2003, 194, transl. ML) This 
dialectic of the friend-foe relationship and mutual entanglement/dependence marks 
the demarcation line between Plessner and Carl Schmitt who absolutises the friend-
foe relationship and postulates it as the central normative principle which politics must 
pursue under all circumstances. 
 
The basic message of Plessner's political anthropology is that in this world there 
cannot be a political community that is free of conflicts of interests and power 
hierarchies and the same goes for interstate relations. In human existence, there is no 
power vacuum, but power struggle – albeit increasingly in 'civilized' forms and in 
judicial garb. For Plessner, the sober and impartial recognition of the entanglement of 
politics and human nature makes it possible to conduct politics as the "art of the 
possible." In this understanding, political anthropology is exactly not the "program of 
an  pessimistic, anti-rational and conservative advocacy of pure power politics", but 
rather it provides the "anthropological foundations of statesmanlike action as a 
welcome help for the leader who has to stay sober and prudent, and needs to know 
when to start the fight at the right moment and when to terminate it." (Plessner 2003, 
145f; transl. ML) 
 
In Kauṭilya's political anthropology, the (political) world is divided, conflicted, and 
anarchical. His conclusion is that this state of political affairs must be adequately taken 
into account when acting politically. That means that all politics come down to the 
issue of enforcing one's own will upon an other or others.14 In order to enforce one's 
will against resistance, Kauṭilya sees four – no more and no less – basic methods of 
political behavior – the four upāyas: 
1) sāman (friendliness, cooperation) 
2) dāna (gift, ingratiation) 
3) bheda (divide et impera) 
4) daṇḍa (use of force). 
 
                                                        
14That corresponds to Max Weber's understanding of 'political struggle' and 'power' (Weber 
1956, 27 and 38) 
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These four methods of politics do not originate with Kauṭilya, but go back to much 
earlier political thought in ancient India. The upāyas are not only echoed by Weber, 
but also Morgenthau who states that „international Politics, like all politics, is a 
struggle for power” and defines power as „man's control over the minds and actions 
of other men“ (Morgenthau 1978, 29 and 30) P. K. Gautam pointed to the section 
„Different Methods of the Balance of Power“ in Morgenthau's Politics among Nations 
which exhibits an astonishing similarity to the upāyas in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (cf. 
Morgenthau 1978, 185-188): „Interestingly, without any reference to Kauṭilya, the 
20th century pioneer of power politics theory Hans J. Morgenthau, in the chapter of 
different methods of balance of power in his book Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, (1966) mentions that 'The balance of power can be 
carried on either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the 
weight of the lighter one.' His chapter has sections on: 1.) Divide and Rule; 2.) 
Compensation; 3.) Armaments; and 4.) Alliances. The four sections are very close to 
the Kauṭilyan concepts of bheda (divide and rule), dāna (compensation), daṇḍa 
(armaments) and sāman (alliances).“ (Gautam 2013b) 
 
Let us take the question of Kauṭilya's political anthropology and his (anthropologically 
rooted) political realism as a reference point for the conceptual homology between 
Kauṭilya on the one side and the modern social scientists Weber, Plessner and 
Morgenthau on the other side, but let's also look at the intellectual connectivity among 
the latter. We do not go here for a (conceptual) 'content analysis', but limit ourselves 
to circumstantial evidence: 
 
Max Weber did read at least some of R. Shamashastry's essays on the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra in Indian Antiquary between 1905 and 1910. (Weber 2008, 621) This 
reading is reflected in Weber's repeated references to Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra in 
his sociology of religion studies on Hinduism and Buddhism. From this work (with its 
references to Kauṭilya), Morgenthau is citing in Politics Among Nations. (Morgenthau 
1978, 9) He was also familiar with Weber's Politics as Vocation which too references 
Kauṭilya. In private remarks, Morgenthau wrote: "Weber 's political thought possessed 
all the intellectual and moral qualities I had looked for in vain in the contemporary 
literature inside and outside the universities " (quoted in: Frei 1994, 96). 
 
But Morgenthau was also familiar with Helmuth Plessner's political anthropology: he 
mentions Plessner's 1931 book Power and Human Nature in his 1933 study The 
Concept of the Political. (Morgenthau 2012, 106) William Scheuerman notes: 
"Reminiscent of the conservative German theorist Helmuth Plessner, author of an 
influential book on politics and human nature, Morgenthau argued that an antagonistic 
model of politics required a deeper grounding in psychology and philosophical 
anthropology. Not only did a realistic or sociological approach demand recourse to the 
laws of politics, but basic political laws derived from fundamental features of human 
nature." (Scheuerman 2009, 37) 
 
 
THE SAPTĀṄGA THEORY: THE SEVEN STATE FACTORS 
The outcome of conflicts of interest or friend-enemy relations both within a political 
community and between political communities is determined by power. It is power 
that decides who wins the struggle and dominates and who is the looser and has to 
back down. First, it should be noted that Kauṭilya – undoubtedly a theorist of power 
politics – refrains from any ideological and/or rhetoric idealization of power. For 
Kauṭilya, power is first of all the obvious attribute of the ruler: the “rod” with which 
he can strike at those who don't submit to his will. Power is the ability of the ruler to 
use force – first personally, then through 'executive organs' (body guards, police, 
military) against insubordination. The monopoly of the legitimate use of force enables 
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the ruler to establish order in his kingdom and to control matsya-nyāya. And in this 
sense, power is constitutive of the state because a powerless state – i.e. without the 
monopoly of the use of force – ceases to be one. Such a 'state' will disintegrate 
internally and fall back into matsya-nyāya or, even more likely, such a 'state' will be 
conquered and annexed by another, more powerful state. In Kauṭilya's basic view of 
power as the capacity to use force as the means to enforce one's will against the 
resistance of others – be it within a state or against another state – there is an evident 
homology with Max Weber, Plessner and Morgenthau. 
 
However, Kauṭilya's concept of power transcends the basic equation of power being 
the state's (exclusive) capacity to use force. There is a second dimension of Kauṭilya's 
concept of power, which is of particular interest for us: the saptāṅga theory. Kauṭilya's 
saptāṅga theory of (state) power refers to the seven prakr̥ti. The term prakr̥ti is 
translated by Kangle as “constituent element of the state” and as “state factor” by 
Meyer: 
 
1) svāmin: the ruler 
2) amātya: the Minister [government and administration] 
3) janapada: the people [in the countryside] 
4) durga: the fortress [capital] 
5) kośa: the treasury [economy] 
6) daṇḍa: armed might 
7) mitra: the ally [in foreign policy]    
 
For Kauṭilya, the seven prakr̥ti constitute (state) power: “The king and his rule [state], 
this is the sum-total of the constituents [state factors].” (VIII, 2, 1) State power is the 
aggregate of the seven state factors. With Kauṭilya's saptāṅga theory the state is no 
longer defined solely by its monopoly of the use of force, because there are six other 
'power factors' beyond daṇḍa. How powerful a state is, is determined by the given 
status and the developmental trend of all the seven prakr̥ti. This new understanding of 
state power is one of Kautilya's outstanding theoretical achievements. 
 
The sequence of the seven state factors indicates the relative weight Kauṭilya assigns 
them. An incompetent ruler produces disastrous consequences for all six consecutive 
state factors, while a good ruler can bring them into optimal condition. “And when the 
king is possessed of excellences, he makes the [other six] constituents perfect with 
their respective excellences.” (VIII, 1, 16) The ranking of the seven prakr̥ti is an 
expression of a logical and substantive hierarchy and generative principle: the state 
factor svāmin factor is the 'generative condition' of the state factor amātya – without 
ruler no 'government' advising him. Ruler and  'government' constitute the institutional 
framework of  the state territory and the people living and working therein (janapada) 
– “the undertakings of the fort, the treasury, the army, the water-works and the 
occupations for livelihood have their source in the country. And bravery, firmness, 
cleverness and large numbers are found among the country people.” (VIII, 1, 29-30) 
 
The first three prakr̥ti combined are the prerequisite for the state factor durga – 
fortress, residence and capital city. In the capital, where the ruler resides with his 
government, also the state treasury (kośa) is located – into which flows the tax revenue 
of the working population. A  well-stocked treasury is the condition for financing the 
armed forces (as well as police and secret service) – state factor daṇḍa. And the prakr̥ti 
1 to 6 are the precondition of successfully conducting foreign policy (mitra). We see 
that the seven prakr̥ti are logically and practically interrelated. 
 
Moreover, Kauṭilya's saptāṅga theory means that state power is no longer an abstract, 
relational magnitude, but an aggregate of material and immaterial variables. That 
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implies that state power can be operationalized by breaking it down into its seven 
components. Thus, state power can, if not precisely measured, at least be adequately 
evaluated and estimated. That includes assessing the positive or negative 
developmental trends of each of the seven prakr̥ti. 
 
For an objective assessment of one's own prakr̥ti, the Kauṭilyan state commands a 
comprehensive census system. The state bureaucracy collects and documents 
demographic, real estate, economic, fiscal and other data. Thus, the state factors 
janapanda, durga, kośa and daṇḍa can be estimated fairly accurately. For example 
janapada: how many peasants produce what agricultural output, what is their surplus 
product, what tax revenue do they generate. What mines do produce what output of 
what type of ore? Or what is output of timber, elephants or herbs from the forest land? 
Is the trend of these economic indicators positive or negative? Or, what is the size of 
the armed forces (daṇḍa), their weapons systems, equipment, logistics or combat 
morale? Or, evaluating the quality of the state bureaucracy (amātya): what level of 
training, competence, efficiency or honesty? However, Kauṭilya advises the ruler to 
use the secret service when it comes to tracing corruption, embezzlement and abuse 
of power within then state bureaucracy. And, Kauṭilyan statecraft requires that the 
('absolutist') ruler must judge soberly and self-critically his own political performance 
in collective policy deliberation with is advisers. “Rulership can be successfully 
carried out only with the help of associates. One wheel alone does not turn. Therefore, 
he should appoint ministers and listen to their opinion ” (I, 7, 9) Kauṭilya does 
vehemently reject 'lonely decisions' of the ruler, who, instead, should consult with 
advisers and “should ascertain their different opinions along with their reasons for 
holding them”. (I, 15, 35) 
 
Evaluating and estimating the prakr̥ti of foreign states is the task of the Kauṭilyan 
(foreign) intelligence service. Spies, diplomats and intelligence informants have to 
collect open and secret data and information on the state factors of other states – 
friendly, neutral or hostile. These 'raw' intelligence data then have to be analyzed and 
assessed by the ruler and his political advisers as to gain the knowledge base for their 
strategic planning. 
 
State power as an aggregate of the seven prakr̥ti it is not just the summation of 
'material' factors, which might include: a) human resources, for example, the number 
of tax-paying peasants or the number of literate and trained administrative bureaucrats; 
b) physical resources, for example size of the grain or rice harvest or annual output of 
iron; c) financial resources, for example, annual tax revenue or the budget 
surplus/deficit. Also, non-material, mental resources are part of (aggregated) state 
power, ranging from the mastery of statecraft by the ruler and his close advisers to the 
skill and productivity of farmers in the countryside and and artisans in cities.  
 
So Kauṭilya provides a substantive concept of state power, which is comprehensive as 
well as differentiated in itself. This is important to avoid an over-fixation and over-
estimation of one or two state factors in assessing state power – i.e. ignoring their 
quasi-genetic dependency on other state factors and fact that state power is determined 
by the totality of the seven prakr̥ti. When we look at the power potential of state we 
may find that the military power factor of this state appears to be very strong: its armed 
forces are quantitatively large. But intelligence analysis may uncover that that this 
same state is rather weak in economic power and financial resources which translates 
into missing pay, low-grade equipment and insufficient supplies – atrophying the 
army's combat power. Conversely, a territorially and demographically small state with 
modest armed forces might become a powerful state in a relatively short time span. 
That can happen if the state factors svāmin and amātya are of excellent quality, which 
means promoting and expanding the economy in the countryside (janapada) and in 
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the city (durga) thus increasing tax revenues (kośa) allowing the armed forces to be 
upgraded (daṇḍa) and conducting a wise foreign policy (amātya). 
     
Kauṭilya's concept of state power as the aggregate of the seven state factors is 
homologous with Morgenthau's concept of "national power" whose components are 
the geographical setting, population size, raw materials, agriculture, industrial 
potential and the armed forces of a state. While these are material and quantitatively 
measurable factors, Morgenthau also includes immaterial factors to “national power” 
which are “national character”, “national morality” and the “quality” of government 
and diplomacy. (cf. Morgenthau 1978, 107-170 ) Even if the homology between 
Kauṭilya's concept of state power as the aggregate of the seven prakr̥ti and 
Morgenthau's concept of “national power” is evident, Kauṭilya's saptāṅga theory was 
developed 2300 years prior to Morgenthau's concept – a truly outstanding theoretical 
achievement. 
 
  
SAPTĀṄGA THEORY, CORRELATION OF FORCES AND THE ṢĀḌGUṆYA 
CONCEPT CLUSTER 
The saptāṅga theory is also of critical importance in operational statecraft. In foreign 
policy, the saptāṅga theory provides the benchmark for the assessment of one's own 
resources and capabilities on the one side and the capabilities of external actors on the 
other side. The result is an 'estimate of the situation' the bottom of which is the 
correlation of forces between states: “ascertaining the (relative) strength or weakness 
of powers”. (IX, 1, 1) The concept of correlation of forces is central in the Arthaśāstra, 
because Kauṭilya wants to eliminate non-reflective, impulsive and arbitrary action in 
foreign policy. Via the saptāṅga theory, Kauṭilya establishes a substantive and 
objective criteria for assessing the correlation of forces between states. And this 
assessment, in turn, predetermines which foreign policy course the ruler should adopt. 
 
Kauṭilya offers a spectrum of six basic approaches in foreign policy – the ṣāḍguṇya 
theory: “The circle of constituent elements [the seven prakr̥ti] is the basis of the six 
measures of foreign policy [ṣāḍguṇya].” (VII, 1, 1) Depending first and foremost on 
the assessment of the correlation of forces (in terms of the respective prakr̥ti), there 
are the following action strategies in foreign affairs: 
 
 saṃdhi, peace > the rival state is stronger and will remain so in the foreseeable 
future 
 vigraha, war > the rival state is vastly inferior in power 
 āsana, neutrality > the correlation of forces is balanced 
 yāna, war preparation, coercive diplomacy > one's own power is rising vis-à-
vis the rival state 
 saṃśraya, alliance building > the rival state's power is rising faster than one's 
own 
 dvaidhībhāva, diplomatic double game > the constellation among rivals and 
allies is very fluid 
 
Kauṭilya insists there are these six – no more and no less – action strategies in foreign 
policy “These are really six measures, because of differences in the situation, say 
Kauṭilya.” (VII, 1, 5) What is of critical importance with respect to the ṣāḍguṇya 
theory is its intrinsic connectivity with the saptāṅga theory. 
 
 the saptāṅga theory provides the benchmark for the correlation of forces 
between rival states. 
 the correlation of forces (in terms of the seven prakr̥ti) preselects, if not 
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determines which of the six action strategies (ṣāḍguṇya) is to be chosen 
 
“Situated within the circle of [the seven] constituent elements, he [the ruler] should, 
in this manner, with these six methods of [foreign] policy, seek to progress from 
decline to stable condition and from stable condition to advancement in his own 
undertakings.” (VII, 1, 38) And: “He who sees the six measures of policy as being 
interdependent in this manner, plays, as he pleases, with the [rival] kings tied by the 
chains of his intellect. (VII, 18, 44)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
KAUṬILYAN RAISON D'ÉTAT: THE OPTIMIZATION OF THE SEVEN 
PRAKR̥TI 
The saptāṅga theory also provides the key for the idea of raison d'état in the 
Arthaśāstra. As mentioned above, Kauṭilya does not uses the term literally, but the 
idea of raison d'état pervades the entire Arthaśāstra if we define it as "the 
unconditional imperative of the state's self-preservation"(Münkler 1987, 49; 
translation M.L). 15 Kauṭilya's most explicit dictum with respect to the idea of raison 
d'état is: 'The source of the livelihood of men is wealth, in other words, the earth 
inhibited by men. The science which is [explicating] the means of the attainment and 
protection of that earth is the Science of Politics.” (XV, 1, 1-2) This understanding of 
raison d'état corresponds to Giovanni Botero's 1589 definition of ragion di stato as 
"the knowledge of the means and measures that are necessary to establish, preserve 
and enlarge a state." (Botero, Della Ragion di Stato, quoted in: Münkler 1987, 169; 
transl. ML) However, both Munkler's and Botero's definitions of raison d'état remain 
abstract as we are not told what the “means and measures” actually are that “establish, 
preserve and enlarge a state.” Even Friedrich Meinecke, who has systematically 
analyzed the historical and intellectual genesis of the category raison d'état or 
staatsraison, deals with it as an abstract principle: 
 
“Staatsraison is the maxim of state action, the state's law of motion. Staatsraison tells 
the statesman what he has to do in order to keep the state in a condition of health and 
power […] The well-being of the state and the people enclosed in it are the value and 
goal [of staatsraison], power, securing and expanding power, are the means to that 
end.” (Meinecke 1963/1924, 1 and 3; transl. M.L) 
 
In contrast, Kauṭilya's much earlier idea of raison d'état transcends the abstract 
principle of state preservation. Kauṭilya does indeed 'tell the statesman' what he needs 
to do in order to 'keep the state in a condition of health and power'. It is – once again 
– the saptāṅga theory which gives the idea of raison d'état a substantive content. 
Kauṭilya 'operationalizes' the abstract notion of (state) power via de-aggregation into 
the seven state factors and then arrives back at a well-defined and substantive notion 
of (state) power via aggregating the seven prakr̥ti. Each of them is thoroughly 
analyzed in the Arthaśāstra, but Kauṭilya is not only interested in the given state of 
the seven prakr̥ti. Much more he is interested in the state factors' trend of development 
and their potential for change – positively or negatively. The status of the prakr̥ti is 
fluid: they can grow and improve or they can deteriorate. A state's power potential 
might stagnate for a while, but sooner than later it will either increase or shrink. 
 
The developmental trend of the prakr̥ti – and this is the crucial point for Kauṭilya – is 
not beyond human control. The directionality of six resp. five state factors can be 
determined or at least be influenced by the ruler and the state administration. Kauṭilya's 
                                                        
15As mentioned earlier, the idea of raison d'état permeates Machiavelli's works, but – as in the 
case of Kauṭilya some 1800 years earlier – the notion of raison d'état is not explicitly articulated 
by him.    
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central focus is to link the prakr̥ti with agency. The prakr̥ti have a potential that is 
open to political 'voluntarism'. Therefore: 
 
 The ruler should provide the best possible political leadership. 
 The 'government' should give the best possible advice to the ruler and excel 
in the political-administrative implementation of state policies. 
 The people in the countryside are to engage in farming as to generate the 
largest possible agricultural surplus product and corresponding tax revenue as 
well as expanding the area under cultivation. 
 In the capital, artisans are to be as skilled and productive as possible, traders 
(and the 'service sector') should have strong sales and pay high taxes 
correspondingly and the city's fortifications should be impregnable. 
 The surplus of government revenues over expenditures should be as large as 
possible, so that the state treasure might be well-endowed 
 The military should have the best training, weapons and supplies – i.e. superb 
combat power. 
 As for the exogenous factor mitra, the allied state's prakr̥ti should be exploited 
to the maximum extent to one's own benefit.  
 
Keeping the state in a condition of health and – growing – power means the expansion 
and improvement of the seven prakr̥ti. Thus, the optimization of the seven state factors 
is raison d'état. With an unambiguous emphasis on agency, Kauṭilya postulates:      
 
“A king endowed with personal qualities endows with excellences the constituent 
elements [prakr̥ti] not so endowed. One not endowed with personal qualities destroys 
the constituent elements that are prosperous and devoted to him. Then that (king) not 
endowed with personal qualities, with defective constituent elements, is either killed 
by the subjects or subjugated by the enemies, even if he be the ruler up to the four ends 
of the earth. But one, possessed of personal qualities, though ruling over a small 
territory, being united with the excellences of the constituent elements, and conversant 
with (the science) of politics, does conquer the entire earth, never loses.” (VI, 1, 16-
18)   
 
Political action in the sense of Kauṭilyan raison d'état means optimizing the prakr̥ti 
and thus upgrading the power of the state and the welfare of the people. Raison d'état 
in terms of the saptāṅga theory provides an operational and substantive concept on 
which statecraft can be based upon. Kauṭilyan raison d'état demands of the ruler to 
remedy deficits and defects of the state factors and their continuous upgrading. Or, to 
put it in modern IR terminology, 'internal balancing' has priority before 'external 
balancing' because it is the immediate and direct way of making and keeping the state 
healthy and powerful. Kauṭilya advises the ruler: first bring own house in order – and 
only thereafter think about the role other actors might play in your political schemes. 
(cf. VII, 6, 12)      
 
But Kauṭilyan raison d'état in terms of the saptāṅga theory applies equally for mitra 
or external balancing. Foreign policy in accordance with Kauṭilyan raison d'état means 
the 'indirect' optimization of one's own prakr̥ti by exploiting for a time the state factors 
of an allied state to one's own benefit – either by providing protection against a third 
state of superior power or helping to conquer a third state of inferior power. In first 
case, one's own state factors are being kept intact or can be improved behind the 'shield' 
(of prakr̥ti) made available by the allied state. In the latter case, the ally is helping in 
the conquest of a third state which means the 'incorporation' of that state's prakr̥ti into 
one's own – i.e. the optimization of the own state factors by enlarging them with those 
of the conquered state. 
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“On thus perceiving the presence of excellence in a gain or a portion of a gain, which 
is definite, he should march after making pacts with confederates, being intent on 
achieving [only] his own object.” (VII, 9, 53)   
 
Kauṭilyan raison d'état can be operationalized into concrete policies for optimal 
'internal balancing'. Based on a thorough assessment of the situation in term of the 
status and developmental trend of one own's prakr̥ti and those of allied, neutral and 
enemy states, concrete policy decisions can (and have to) be made as to which of the 
prakr̥ti most urgently need to be upgraded quantitatively and/or qualitatively. The 
order of priority and the ways of implementation with respect to the optimization of 
the state factors is a matter of the political skill of the ruler and the specific, tactical 
situation. But for all these contingent political considerations and resulting policy 
measures, there is a substantive benchmark: raison d'état in terms of the optimization 
of the state's prakr̥ti – quite the opposite of ‘Asiatic’ inertia and stasis. 
 
Throughout the Arthaśāstra, Kauṭilya tells us that there is no standstill in the political 
world. Change is what is constant in politics. States always go into a certain direction: 
“decline, stability and advancement” (VI, 2,4) States may stagnate, but it won't take 
long before decline or ascend becomes discernible. There are no permanent friends, 
foes or neutrals. Interstate relations are fluid: today's friend is tomorrow's enemy and 
vice versa. Kauṭilya insists that the ruler must know about the changes in the political 
situation, preferably before they have fully manifested themselves. “He, who is well 
versed in the science of politics, should employ all the means, viz. advancement, 
decline and stable condition as well as weakening and extermination.” (VII, 18, 43)      
 
 
KAUṬILYAN RAISON D'ÉTAT AS THE POLITY'S 'BASIC NORM'   
Kauṭilyan raison d'état seems to be situated outside the realm of normativity. Securing 
and expanding the power of the state via the optimization of the seven state factors 
appears to be undiluted purposive rationality – 'pure power politics'. In contrast, the 
normative sphere of Kauṭilyan statecraft appears to be summed up in an ethical dictum 
that seems far distant to and incompatible with 'power politics': 
 
“In the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and in what is beneficial 
to the subjects his own benefit. What is dear to himself is not beneficial to the king, 
but what is dear to the subjects is beneficial (to him).” (I, 19, 34) 
 
This normative dictum should not been seen declaratory. But, if Kauṭilya is serious 
about it, how can it coexist with Kauṭilyan raison d'état in the sense of securing and 
expanding the power of the state? Kauṭilya is unambiguous that policies dictated by 
raison d'état do involve wars (of aggression), extrajudicial killings, deception, lies and 
breach of treaty. Such unethical behavior features prominently in the upāyas and the 
ṣāḍguṇya. And such state policies, which differ radically from generally accepted 
ethical norms, are hardly compatible with the happiness of the people. The basic canon 
of morality, as defined by Kauṭilya, is: “abstaining from injury (to living creatures), 
truthfulness, uprightness, freedom from malice, compassionateness and forbearance.” 
(I, 3, 13) However, for Kauṭilya, even highly 'unethical' state action, if guided by 
raison d'état, has not only a normative eigenvalue, but serves the people. For him, 
strengthening state capacity is the conditio sine qua non for the happiness of the 
people. 
 
Kauṭilya takes a position which denies that there is a dichotomy between purposive 
rationality and normativity if one accepts his understanding of raison d'état. Indeed, 
when looking at the premise of the Kauṭilyan state – preventing the relapse into 
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matsya-nyāya – the question arises whether this premise is purposive-rational or 
normative in character? Or, is it both? Indeed, for Kauṭilya, maintaining and 
strengthening the power of the state and ensuring the happiness of the people are two 
sides of the same coin. For him, both are political necessities (in the sense of purposive 
rationality) and both have a political-normative dimension. Albeit in a paradoxical 
fashion, the previously mentioned central dictum of the Arthaśāstra expresses the dual 
character (political rationality and normativity) of Kauṭilyan raison d'état: “'Material 
well-being [artha] alone is supreme,' says Kauṭilya. For spiritual good [dharma, 
ethics] and sensual pleasures [kāma] depend on material well-being.” (I, 7, 6-7) In 
other words, without exercising political power and pursuing material wealth, there 
won't be morality in the political sphere. For Kauṭilya, there is no 'stand-alone' 
morality in politics separated from power and wealth. Instead, in the political sphere, 
power and wealth on the one side and ethics on the other side are dialectically 
interrelated.   
 
The optimization of the seven prakr̥ti originates from the purposive-rational political 
calculation of maintaining and expanding power of the state. At the same time, the 
power of the state is the prerequisite for meeting the normative requirement to ensure 
the happiness and welfare of the people. Without the optimization of the prakr̥ti – 
driven by purposive political rationality – the people would sink into poverty and 
matsya-nyāya would loom – the very opposite of the happiness of people. The 
paramount duty of the ruler (or the state), to strive for the happiness of the people and 
to prevent matsya-nyāna, has an intrinsic normative character resp. eigenvalue. At the 
same time, this political-ethical obligation of the ruler is an expression of purposive 
political rationality: growing state power by optimizing the prakr̥ti – notably with 
respect to the economy – will also make the people materially saturated and politically 
content which guarantees of the stability and power of the state. Materially saturated 
and 'happy' people will keep quiet and gratefully accept the ruler and his government 
as legitimate. They welcome a powerful state which is capable of preventing matsya-
nyāya – both domestically and with respect to foreign powers. 
 
In the paragraph “Causes Leading to Decline, Greed and Disaffection among the 
Subjects,” Kauṭilya gives an detailed account of 'bad governance' like “discarding the 
good and favouring the wicked”, “starting unrighteous injuries”, “doing acts that 
should not be done” or the “destruction  of well-being [artha]”. (VII, 5, 19-16) Such 
political practices, if they occur outside the constraints of raison d'état, are evil in 
normative terms. But engaging in them, is equally counterproductive, if not self-
destructive in political terms. In other words: he who submits to 'normal' evil in 
politics, is acting no only immorally, but commits the supreme crime of political life: 
stupidity. Outside the narrow path of raison d'état, immorality in politics is plain 
stupid. The following citation demonstrates the dialectical entanglement of purposive 
political rationality and normativity that characterizes the Arthaśāstra:   
 
“Subjects, when impoverished, become greedy; when greedy they become disaffected; 
when disaffected they either go over to the enemy or themselves kill the master. 
Therefore, he [the ruler] should not allow these causes of decline, greed and 
disaffection among the subjects to arise, or, if arisen, should immediately counter-act 
them.” (VII, 5, 27-28) 
 
In Kauṭilya's dialectical entanglement of purposive political rationality and 
normativity lies a significant difference to Meinecke – in spite of the homology 
between the Kauṭilyan idea of raison d'état and Meinecke's. Let's recount that both for 
Meinecke and  Kauṭilya, raison d'état has a normative and a purposive-rational 
dimension: “The well-being of the state and the people enclosed in it are the value and 
goal [of raison d'état], power, securing and expanding power are the means to that 
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end.” (Meinecke 1963/1924, 3; transl. ML) But while Kauṭilya sees a symbiosis of 
political normativity and rationality, Meinecke sees an unbridgeable rift. Raison d'état 
as political action for the purpose of maintaining and expanding the power of the state 
creates for Meinecke a irresolvable normative dilemma. If the state acts with political 
purposive-rationality in line with raison d'état, it will inevitable commit “sins” of the 
most severe kind. Not so for Kauṭilya: when political action derived from raison d'état 
collides with the above mentioned canon of basic ethical values, he knows no 
hesitation: what raison d'état demands to be done, must be done. There might be 
regrettable, tragic consequences when acting in accordance with raison d'état, but such 
action cannot become an ethical dilemma. In Book I, chapters 17 and 18, Kauṭilya 
deals with the legitimate and politically competent crown prince repudiated by the 
king-father. If the alternate successor chosen by the king is also competent in 
statecraft, Kauṭilya says, the legitimate prince must accept his fate and retire to a life 
in seclusion. However, in case designated successor is politically incompetent, the 
crown prince should overthrow his father and kill him along with the chosen successor 
because they are a threat to health and power of the state. So, Kauṭilya is not masking 
out the tragic dimension of raison d'état, but long as the state leader adheres to it, his 
action cannot be 'sinful' or 'unethical'. 
 
Through the symbiosis of  political normativity and rationality, raison d'état 
constitutes a 'basic norm' of higher 'cardinality' in the sphere of statecraft. Raison d'état 
as 'basic norm' supersedes and overrides the 'regular' ethical canon. Those who accuse 
Kauṭilya of sacrificing morality at the altar of raison d'état, ought to keep in mind that 
is was Plato in the Politea, who – like Kauṭilya – distinguished between ethics in 
general and the political ethics of statecraft. Plato's political ethics include, for 
example, the state's right to use 'noble lies' in politics – thus violating the supreme 
principle of Platonic ethics: truth. Or, another example, the Platonic state is given the 
right to pursue policies of eugenics including infanticide. (cf. Hillebrandt 1923, 36 and 
155)    
 
There is, however, a third normative dimension to Kauṭilyan raison d'état in addition 
to the fusion of maintaining and expanding the power of state and the welfare of the 
people. This third normative dimension covers the sphere of foreign policy. As 
indicated above, the optimization of the prakr̥ti with respect to Kauṭilyan foreign 
policy means that the prakr̥ti of other states get 'incorporated' into one's own by 
conquering these states or turning them into vassals. Does this kind of (exogenous) 
enlarging and upgrading of one's own state factors mean a policy of unrestrained 
military conquest and imperialist expansion? The answer is a – qualified – No. 
 
Kauṭilyan raison d'état in interstate affairs – i.e. the optimization of one's own prakr̥ti 
by capturing the exogenous prakr̥ti of conquered/vassal states – draws a clear (geo-
cultural) line of demarcation. Within the geo-cultural space of the Indian subcontinent, 
Kauṭilyan raison d'état means revisionism: all state factors (of the various political 
entities on the subcontinent) are to be aggregated into the formation of one pan-Indian 
state entity. For Kauṭilya, the 'strategic' aim of politically unifying the Indian 
subcontinent gains a normative quality and thus becomes a central feature of raison 
d'état.16 The “six methods of foreign policy” (ṣāḍguṇya) in the service of raison d'état 
are explicitly meant to facilitate the political unification of the Indian subcontinent – 
preferably by the five non-violent methods. But if that were not possible, war is ultima 
ratio. Within the geo-cultural space of the Indian subcontinent, Kauṭilyan foreign 
policy is revisionist and expansionist.   
                                                        
16Here lies, again, a similarity between Kauṭilya and Machiavelli whose strategic (and 
'normative') goal was the political (re-)unification of Italy and its liberation from Spanish, 
French and German domination (cf. Drekmeier 1962, Meinecke 1963, Hale 1972)        
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However, the strategic and normative goal of politically unifying the Indian 
subcontinent as part of Kauṭilyan raison d'état has yet another normative dimension: 
what is valid within, is not valid beyond the Indian subcontinent. Revisionism and 
expansionism are completely absent in Kauṭilyan foreign policy with respect to the 
states located outside the Indian subcontinent. In the Arthaśāstra, there is not the 
slightest hint pointing in the direction of imperial proclivities beyond the Indian geo-
cultural space. Kauṭilya's normatively charged determination for the political 
unification of the subcontinent 'stops' in the Himalayas and in Afghanistan. There is 
no desire for imperial expansion towards the Graeco-Persian Empire, Central Asia, 
Indochina, China or the Indo-Pacific islands. Within the (unified) subcontinent, the 
optimization/aggregation of the totality of prakr̥ti is Kauṭilyan raison d'état, but the 
very same raison d'état becomes a normative 'barrier' when it comes to politico-
military expansion beyond the subcontinent. Beyond India, Kauṭilyan raison d'état 
demands a foreign policy of 'balance of power' with other states. 
 
 
THE KAUṬILĪYA ARTHAŚĀSTRA: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND 
STATECRAFT 
 
According to B.H. Liddell Hart, grand strategy can be understood as a 'holistic' 
alignment of strategic thinking on the overall constellation of the political, social, 
moral, economic, military and cultural resources available to a state. (Liddell Hart 
1967, 322) Grand strategy means that strategic thinking and action is aimed to bring 
about a context-adequate mix of all state resources for the realization of state interests 
and goals. (cf. Kovac/Marcek, 2013) This concept of grand strategy is homologous to 
Kauṭilya's synoptic idea of statecraft and his comprehensive understanding of political 
science which, as evidenced in the Arthaśāstra, covers state, governance, economy, 
law, foreign policy/diplomacy, military affairs and intelligence. Consequently, the 
Arthaśāstra is about synthesizing military, diplomatic, legal, governance or economic 
strategies into into grand strategy in accordance with raison d'état. (cf. Bozeman 1992) 
 
What we see here, is the “modernity of tradition” (Rudolph & Rudolph 1968) – as 
represented by ancient Indian political thought which is (uniquely) articulated by 
Kauṭilya in the Arthaśāstra. He lays out  conceptual building blocks of timeless 
relevance for political science and grand strategy. The Indian tradition of the 
intellectual “re-use of the past” (Mitra 2012) for current political challenges is both 
undertheorized and underutilized in (modern) political science. Thus, the intellectual 
vibrancy of this classical text of political theory and statecraft should induce us to 
engage with the Arthaśāstra's core ideas productively, albeit critically: 
 
 with the saptāṅga theory the power of the state gets a substantive content: the 
aggregate of the seven prakr̥ti. 
 the optimization of the seven state factors constitutes Kauṭilyan raison d'état 
which facilitates not only the strengthening of the power of the state, but also 
the welfare of the people – therefore gaining the character of a 'basic norm'   
 the third normative dimension of Kauṭilyan raison d'état is the determined 
thrust towards 'regional' political unification, however coupled with the 
'normative barrier' against exogenous imperial-expansionist designs 
 the ṣāḍguṇya theory based upon the concept of the correlation of forces in 
terms of the saptāṅga theory defines a spectrum of foreign policy strategies 
for enforcing state interests and goals in the sense of grand strategy. 
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Kauṭilya's ideas and concepts in the Arthaśāstra represent an untapped reservoir of 
ideas and concepts that can be used to tackle political science puzzles. That goes both 
for the history of political thought and for theory building with respect to current 
questions and puzzles of political science, including International Relations theory. 
The portfolio of such research questions could include: factors constituting state 
capacity, the dialectics of  economy and security, strategic autonomy and 
nonalignment, 'the non-imperial great power', the concept of multipolarity, or research 
issues with respect to 'neoclassical realism' in IR theory and theoretical questions in 
the field of Intelligence Studies, notably with respect to intelligence analysis, 
assessment and estimates. The analysis and explication of the central ideas and 
concepts of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra with the help of 'covariant' or structurally 
homologous categories of political science should be a – long overdue – contribution 
to introducing a 'de-orientalized' Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra in the political science 
discourse internationally. 
  
  
Michael Liebig 
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